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Moynihan and the Neocons
Greg Weiner

I

n h i s bio g r a ph y of Norman Podhoretz, Thomas Jeffers reports that one St. Patrick’s Day — Podhoretz could not recall the
year — United States senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan alighted unannounced on his old friend’s Manhattan doorstep to offer an accounting
of himself. The precise content of the conversation is unrecorded, but
tension over Moynihan’s senatorial record — on policy toward the
Soviets especially — was generally understood to have strained the men’s
years-long friendship.
Today, more than a generation after that encounter, and more than a
decade after the senator’s death, many neoconservatives still want an accounting from Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Their dispositions are at once
admiring and aggravated; the intellectual kinship is often celebrated,
though sometimes mixed with accusations of ideological betrayal. I
was at a recent conference of political scientists, presenting a paper on
Moynihan, when one audience member, perfectly pleasant and seemingly admiringly disposed toward the scholar-statesman, exclaimed:
“Reagan could have used Moynihan’s help, but he didn’t get it because
Moynihan liked being a senator!” The accusation is not uncommon.
Neither is the underlying assumption: Moynihan was one of us, but his
politics trumped his principles.
Yet the veracity of the charge hinges on to whom the “us” refers.
Some tenets of neoconservatism — at least as its “godfather,” Irving
Kristol, elucidated it — reasonably describe Moynihan. But Moynihan
always rejected “neoconservatism” as a label, and what neoconservatism eventually became, a political movement, never enticed him. He
always felt that the goals that he did share with Kristol — what Kristol
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described as a “conservative welfare state” that rejected the Great Society
model, for example, appears to be close to what Moynihan understood
to be the ethic of the New Deal — were properly described as liberal.
And a liberal is what Moynihan was through and through: a New
Dealer for whom the Democratic Party was as much a Burkean platoon politically as his local Catholic parish was ethnically. His essential
principles remained unchanged between the first ballot he cast in the
basement of St. Raphael’s Church in Hell’s Kitchen in 1948 and the last
vote he cast in the chamber of the United States Senate 52 years later. The
pandemonium of the 1960s distressed but never disillusioned him — a
distinction that is decisive for understanding why he declined to join
the neoconservative defection from the Democratic Party. Moynihan, a
self-aware thinker entitled to self-description, resisted the neoconservative label with emphatic consistency.
And yet: Some of his most important writings were published in the
pages of The Public Interest, including on the cover of its first issue half a
century ago. Some of his most cherished friends and intellectual partners were named Kristol, Himmelfarb, Podhoretz, and Decter. Some
of his closest aides — Elliott Abrams, Checker Finn — enlisted in the
Reagan revolution. Moynihan was a fervent anti-totalitarian, an impassioned defender of Israel, and a career-long welfare reformer. His affinity
with and appeal to neoconservatism were real.
But the claim of a conversion of convenience — that Moynihan the neocon intellectual became Moynihan the New York liberal in order to retain
his Senate seat — is belied by the clear evidence of Moynihan’s liberalism in
the public record well before he took the senatorial oath in 1977. This is not
to say he never changed his mind, but the only truly major change — his
evolution regarding U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union (not a small matter, to be sure) — is much more explicable by shifting information than by
crass politics. But Moynihan’s consistency is more difficult to see because
the character of American liberalism changed around him. Moynihan’s
singular strain of liberalism — what I have called “Burkean liberalism,” a
liberalism of locality and limitation — renders him inescapably vulnerable
to co-optation. These elements of his thought constitute a woven figure
that cannot be undone if he is to be coherently understood. If its Burkean
and liberal components are detached, Moynihan easily appears to belong
to either the traditionally conservative or conventionally liberal camps,
rather than being properly located on his own distinctive ground.
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Ultimately, of course, understanding Moynihan’s thought on its own
terms is more important than choosing which label to give it. But there
is something in a name, and something in the fact that Moynihan so
emphatically resisted this one. That may have to do with the evolution
of neoconservatism from an intellectual current in its exile years to a
political power in its ascendant period. Moynihan’s dispute was not so
much with the ideas of the gifted New York circle of intellectuals who
became the neoconservatives, though such disputes would emerge. It
was with the fact that, as he put it in 1988, they had “gone over” — having
concluded that these principles would be best pursued in the Republican
Party. This Moynihan never accepted.
W h at Is Neoconservat ism ?
In 1976, the year Moynihan was first elected to the Senate, Irving Kristol
set forth five principles of neoconservatism. Moynihan at this point had
been a prominent public intellectual for over a decade. It is as likely that
Kristol’s neoconservatism was influenced by Moynihan’s liberalism as the
other way around; almost certainly the reality is that the men influenced
each other. In any case, the mere fact of compatibility between their ideas
does not prove that Moynihan was a neoconservative any more than it
proves that Kristol was a liberal. But some likenesses are striking.
First, Kristol argued that “[n]eoconservatism is not at all hostile to
the idea of a welfare state, but it is critical of the Great Society version
of this welfare state.” The problem was that the Great Society intruded
into subsidiary social institutions. This view, as we shall see, was entirely
compatible with concerns Moynihan had been voicing about the Great
Society since the mid-1960s.
The question is how to describe the welfare state that remains when
the micromanaging superstructure of the Great Society is removed.
Moynihan simply called it the New Deal. Kristol repeatedly described
it as a “conservative” welfare state. Kristol, to be sure, emphasized the
need for a fiscally sustainable welfare state; on the other hand, one of
Moynihan’s last major bills sought to mitigate Social Security’s solvency
crisis, including by addressing benefit growth and adding a private account, and one of his last public acts was to serve on George W. Bush’s
Social Security commission. In his correspondence, Moynihan described
the private Social Security accounts as a means of spreading ownership
of assets. He never regarded this position as anything other than liberal.
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Second, Kristol stated, neoconservatives “ha[d] learned to have great
respect” for markets and preferred, when it was necessary to interfere
with them for social purposes, to do so within a market framework.
Reserved judgment is the better part of prudence on this score as regards
Moynihan; his writings do not delineate a comprehensive economic
doctrine. He did say a guaranteed income would allow the poor to make
their own market choices, and he lamented the “radical disjunction”
in liberal thinking “between the production of wealth and its distribution.” But it is also fair to say his Senate votes were probably more
conventionally liberal than what Kristol had in mind.
Next, “[n]eoconservatism,” Kristol wrote, “tends to be respectful of
traditional values and institutions: religion, the family, the ‘high culture’
of Western civilization.” Moynihan had been expressing this view, too,
for a decade — including firm and principled opposition to the radical
left of the 1960s — and understood his view as, properly speaking, the
liberal one. He repeatedly and admiringly invoked the Catholic doctrine
of subsidiarity, the idea that a problem should be addressed by the closest
competent social institution; he was a lifelong crusader for the family; his
favorite quotation of Burke was the Reflections’ “little platoons.”
Fourth, and perhaps the greatest point of tension, Kristol said neoconservatism rejected “equality of condition” as “a proper goal for
government to pursue.” Moynihan, by contrast, had said in The Negro
Family: The Case for National Action in 1965 that equality of condition
was the next step in the fight for racial equality. It is unclear to what
extent Moynihan and Kristol would disagree on policy on this front,
but certainly the rhetorical inflection differed.
Finally, “neoconservatism believes that American democracy is
not likely to survive for long in a world that is overwhelmingly hostile to American values.” Kristol noted, however, that there was only
a “weak” consensus among neoconservatives about what precisely
this meant. They had gone “every which way” on Vietnam, for example, a war Moynihan had opposed. Within the broad parameters
of this description, certainly Moynihan — again, describing himself as
liberal — conforms to it.
The challenge of description lies in the fact that what Kristol forecast
next did occur — but only half of it: “[I]f the political spectrum moved
rightward and we should become ‘neoliberal’ tomorrow, I could accept
that too.” The spectrum did move rightward, but the neoconservatives
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did not become neoliberals, at least not as the term is usually understood. Many, to Moynihan’s dismay, moved rightward with it.
Moynihan wrote in 1988: “I was by this time [1984] a bit estranged
from a greatly gifted circle of New York writers who first came together
in dismay at the ‘liberal’ politics of the 1960s. Many had gone over to the
Republicans: many had entered the new administration or assertively
supported it. I hadn’t, didn’t, wouldn’t, don’t.”
But even Kristol’s description — “neoliberal” — Moynihan likely
would not apply to himself, for it suggests something new, a reaction to
the 1960s that caused a mutated strain of liberalism to emerge. Moynihan
felt his feet were planted in one place the whole time. It was the left that
split from liberalism. The gifted circle of neoconservatives reacted to the
“liberal” policies (the qualifying quotation marks are Moynihan’s) of
the 1960s. Moynihan did not regard them as actually liberal. Kristol famously described a neoconservative as a liberal mugged by reality. This
was a liberal changed, a liberal who became something else. Moynihan
was never thus assaulted. He thought it was the New Deal that had been
mugged — by the Great Society.
Moy nih a n a s Liber a l
We can begin to understand Moynihan’s liberalism by starting where
he did: with ethnicity. It is too strong, but not by much, to describe his
affinity with the Democratic Party in those terms. He used to tell students that the most important datum in ascertaining a person’s political
affiliation was the year he was born. Moynihan thus wrote Jane Perlez of
the New York Times in 1983 that his “ ‘ideological roots’ [were] not, and in
truth could not be, in the ‘neo-conservative movement.’ I am a 56 year
old man: my ideological roots are in the Democratic party of Franklin
D. Roosevelt.” He spoke of government as “the instrument of the common purpose” and admiringly of the New Deal as “an ethic of collective
provision.” Moynihan would even use the “liberal” moniker for several
dispositions other commentators might describe as conservative: what
he called the liberal belief in “restraint” and the “persistence of sin,” for
example; similarly, “the doctrines of liberalism are derived from experience, rather than right reason.”
Moynihan was acutely aware of the emergence of neoconservatism — it engaged some of his closest intellectual and personal
friends — but his decision not to join the revolt was equally deliberate.
159

N at iona l Affa ir s · W i n t e r 2016

That he was associated with the movement, often by mere dint of his
friendships, often annoyed and sometimes amused him. In his United
Nations memoir, A Dangerous Place, he wrote of the early to mid-1970s,
when socialists attempted to influence the Democratic Party:
The Straussians would now presumably resume their critique
of liberalism, allied with a point of view that was coming to be
known as “neo-conservative,” a term that had first appeared in
[Irving] Howe’s journal, Dissent, and was now being applied with
no very fine distinction to persons such as Kristol, who was indeed one, to [Daniel] Bell, who demanded the right to remain a
socialist, and to persons of the center such as myself, resigned to
the fate of personifying, at one and the same time, “neoconservatism” to Michael Harrington and “left-liberalism” to William F.
Buckley, Jr.
Moynihan here described himself as a man of the “center,” but elsewhere when he spoke of the center, he specified the “liberal” center. This
liberal center — as opposed to the liberal left — subscribed to New Deal
liberalism, not Great Society liberalism. In Moynihan’s understanding, New Deal liberalism was ameliorative; Great Society liberalism
was transformative. New Deal liberalism operated macroeconomically;
Great Society liberalism functioned micromanagerially. The crowning
triumph of New Deal liberalism was thus Social Security, a massive
program of redistribution that enlisted government in its core competence of collecting funds and cutting checks, and in the process turned
the poorest class of citizens into the wealthiest. The characteristic failure of Great Society liberalism was the Community Action Program
Moynihan chronicled in his book Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding;
it sought to insert the federal government into neighborhoods and to
finance both political upheaval and social transformation.
The Great Society years inspired Moynihan’s most searching and
systematic thinking about politics, and he wrote in Coping, his collection of essays from that era, that “[t]he Federal government is good at
collecting revenues, and rather bad at disbursing services. Therefore,
we should use the Federal fisc as an instrument for redistributing income between different levels of government, different regions and
different classes.”
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The Great Society could be said to have done this in a sense, but not
the sense one would wish. In one of his characteristic bursts of insight,
Moynihan observed that the actual effect of the Great Society — which
for a time taxed the poor to pay middle-class social workers to minister to
them — was probably to redistribute income upward. Godfrey Hodgson’s
seminal biography The Gentleman from New York recalls that Moynihan
once told a group of Harvard students who accosted him about Nixon
Administration education cuts that they were “defending a class interest”:
As future teachers and education bureaucrats, they were going to receive
the funds they sought to protect. Social workers, Moynihan noted on
another occasion, should beware of sanctimony. It was fine for them
to claim they chose their profession in order to do good, but they were
also compensated for the service. Meanwhile, “[s]hoe-factory workers in
Manchester, almost certainly earning considerably less than social workers in the same city, are not permitted to declare that they have chosen
their profession for humanitarian reasons.”
Rather than sending Moynihan searching for a new philosophy, either
a conservatism or a neoconservatism, all this reinforced his faith in the
old one: the basic ameliorative ethic of the New Deal. Witness his bold
attempt to extend the insurance principle of the New Deal to the entire
working population through the guaranteed income. To achieve this,
he enlisted in the Nixon Administration, a move that is often misunderstood to reflect disenchantment with liberalism but that in fact reflects
an immense confidence in it. That Moynihan joined forces with Nixon is
undeniably significant but is in a larger sense also incidental to his policy
aims. Moynihan wanted to pursue the guaranteed income — a project,
he said afterward, of “political liberals” — and felt the Democratic Party
was, as he put it, ideologically “exhausted” from the battles of the 1960s.
Nixon, by contrast, was interested. James Q. Wilson would later observe
that Moynihan served four presidents of two parties, Kennedy through
Ford, “not because he had no views but because he persuaded the presidents in each case that their views should move toward his.”
That Moynihan adhered to the basic elements of the New Deal helps
to explain why, to the consternation of later neoconservatives, he opposed welfare reform in 1995 and 1996. Moynihan’s objection was not
to the concept of reform, a goal he had pursued for decades. He had,
in fact, authored the legislation that unleashed the much ballyhooed
gubernatorial experiments in welfare policy. Moynihan objected to
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repealing the federal guarantee of welfare benefits for dependent children. This was a retreat from the New Deal — a repeal, not a reform,
of what he saw as one of the New Deal’s greatest and most humanitarian achievements. Welfare reform was, to Moynihan, one more
utopian enterprise — ironically reminiscent of the Great Society —
accompanied by excessive promises and overly bold faith in the human
capacity to predict the consequences of policy. “Scholars have been
working at these issues for years now,” he implored, describing the bill
as unconservative, “and the more capable they are, the more tentative
and incremental their findings.”
During the course of that debate, as in earlier ones, it often fell to
Moynihan to defend the Great Society against excessive calumnies. He
wrote the Moynihan Report, which charted the disintegration of the
African-American family, on the basis of datasets that preceded the first
shot in the War on Poverty, so he had ample reason to reject claims of
a causal connection between the Great Society and the social ills that
followed — variations on which were occurring in all nations of the
Atlantic world regardless of their welfare policies.
Other elements of the 1960s elicited his more explicit disgust.
Violence became chic, words the handmaiden of will. This was no class
revolution; it was elite anomie. “The president of Yale toyed with it,”
he wrote; “the president of the AFL-CIO wouldn’t touch it.” Moynihan
would later note that the platform of Students for a Democratic Society,
the contented work of middle-class radicals, was silent on the topic of
poverty. Though he opposed the escalating American involvement in
Vietnam, Moynihan said he nonetheless could not “accept the great debasement of language and the fantasizing of politics that accompanied
the reaction to the war.”
But this again was a derangement of liberalism, and thus no cause for
Moynihan to abandon the doctrine itself. Indeed, in the culture wars of
the 1960s that so strained his patience, Moynihan likely saw a cousin to,
if not a twin of, the conflict that dominated the politics of his youth: the
split between the mainstream and patriotic liberalism he espoused and
the deluded faction of Stalinist enthusiasts on the hard left.
T he Liber a l A n t i- Commu nist
Moynihan’s staunch opposition to communism led to perhaps his
most striking affinity and most serious strain with the neoconservative
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movement. As a veteran of the early battles between liberals and
Stalinists, Moynihan knew that anti-communism was not sufficient
to render one conservative. Moynihan and his Senate mentor, Henry
“Scoop” Jackson of Washington state, stood in a long tradition of liberals who hewed simultaneously to unrelenting anti-communist and New
Dealer beliefs. Indeed, the New Deal, many believed, had saved the
country from having to face a significant Stalinist movement during
the Depression years.
Moynihan first came to public attention on foreign affairs with the
appearance of his seminal Commentary essay “The United States in
Opposition,” which argued that the government should treat the United
Nations General Assembly as a parliamentary body in which, as an opposition party, America’s most powerful weapons were rhetorical. As
ambassador to the U.N., he thus thundered away against despots like
Idi Amin and fought the seemingly trivial but cumulatively damaging
resolutions of the anti-American nations that assailed the supposedly
oppressive West while denying their own illiberalism.
His first Senate address opposed the nomination of Paul Warnke to
head the 1977 SALT negotiations. Warnke’s 1975 Foreign Policy article
“Apes on a Treadmill” had called on the United States to disarm certain weapons systems unilaterally in the hopes of Soviet reciprocation.
Moynihan thought this foolish. Significantly, in the course of explaining himself, Moynihan reminded his colleagues of his opposition to
the Vietnam War. He had been a board member of Americans for
Democratic Action, he noted, and in that capacity had voted not to endorse Lyndon Johnson for re-election in 1968. But he had done so because
he perceived an expansive totalitarian threat from which the Vietnam
War was a distraction. The war was a mistake but not an ignoble one.
He later chastised President Carter for his national self-flagellation over
the war: “[W]hy describe our failure in terms that make us so culpable
rather than merely fallible?”
It was not surprising, consequently, that admirers of Moynihan
experienced more than a bit of whiplash when, in the early 1980s, he
began supporting a less aggressive posture toward the Soviets. Critics
have imputed this to partisanship: Either Moynihan was tacking left to
prevent a liberal challenge in his 1982 re-election, or he was motivated by
animus toward Ronald Reagan. Yet a simpler explanation, more charitable and more in character — with external evidence as support — is
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available: Moynihan changed his mind because new information became available. In the late 1970s, demographic studies showed male life
expectancy declining in the Soviet Union. Moynihan observed that such
a decline was all but impossible in the modern world; something in the
Soviet Union was going seriously wrong. “If demography is destiny,”
Moynihan would later write, “this was a society growing ill. Or, if you
like, breaking down.”
These considerations led Moynihan to his astonishingly prescient
1979 prediction, printed in Newsweek, that the Soviet Union could collapse along ethnic lines within a decade. By the early 1980s, the policy
conclusion followed: Let them collapse. Attempting to accelerate the
process — which was what Moynihan understood the Reagan policy to
be doing — entailed actions that were prudentially and legally precarious. In a 1984 commencement address at New York University, he thus
concluded: “Our grand strategy should be to wait out the Soviet Union;
its time is passing. Let us resolve to be here, our old selves, with an ever
surging font of ideas. When the time comes, it will be clear that in the
end freedom did prevail.”
During this period, Moynihan grew increasingly alarmed at what
he characterized as the Reagan administration’s challenges to, if not
outright violations of, international law. The CIA’s mining of the
Nicaraguan harbors was the most flagrant example; Moynihan called it
an act of war. The invasion of Grenada, he argued, violated the charter
of the Organization of American States. Neoconservatives and traditional conservatives have assailed these positions, but none of them were
new. Moynihan had supported international law as a basis of relations
among states his entire career. As early as his doctoral dissertation at
Tufts, which explored the rise of the International Labor Organization
in the aftermath of World War I, he had harbored hope for the system
of international law emanating from the Treaty of Versailles.
The year before “The United States in Opposition” appeared, he
gave an admiring, if complex, lecture on Woodrow Wilson on the 50th
anniversary of the 28th president’s death. Moreover, far from being a
summons to hard-nosed realpolitik, “The United States in Opposition”
was a call to hold critics of the West to standards of law, including the
U.N. Charter. Nor was the invocation of international law a partisan
tool sharpened for Reagan alone: In 1980, Moynihan had gone so far
as to oppose President Carter’s mission to rescue the U.S. hostages in
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Tehran on the grounds that the nation was awaiting a ruling on the situation from the International Court of Justice.
Of course, Moynihan may have been wrong in some or all of this.
But he was not a political opportunist. A superficial dichotomy that pits
hawks against doves in foreign policy — a dynamic assuming that some
were tough on the Soviets, others weak — may obscure this fact. By that
measure, Moynihan might indeed be seen to have defected from the
hawks to the doves. Senator Frank Church made that error in reverse
in responding to Moynihan’s Warnke speech with surprise, declaring
that he preferred the Moynihan of a decade earlier, presumably the
Moynihan who had opposed the Vietnam War. The suggestion was that
one was either for war or for accommodation. But to Moynihan, one
was either for effective and lawful opposition to totalitarianism or one
was not. His changing votes arose not from changes in that principle
but from changes in the facts to which it was applied.
Moynihan remained a principled defender of democracy but was
never an advocate for assertive efforts to spread it. On the contrary, he
explicitly warned against them:
[O]ur optimism, belief in progress, and the possibility of achieving human happiness on earth, combined with our considerable
achievement in this respect at home, have led us to an increasingly
dangerous and costly effort to extend our system abroad. We are
in the grip of what Reinhold Niebuhr has called “The Myth of
Democratic Universality. ”
Instead, the United States, he believed, should fight battles of ideas in
ideological forums. It should maintain a posture of nuclear deterrence.
And, once he concluded the Soviet Union was doomed, he said it should
be allowed to die. That this latter position happened to align his votes
with those who had always sought accommodation with the Soviets,
even in the heyday of totalitarianism, does not suggest a realignment of
his ideas. Michael Barone later explained: “Moynihan began voting with
the foreign policy doves, but for different reasons: They believed that the
Soviet Union was dangerous but not evil . . . Moynihan believed that the
Soviet Union was evil but not dangerous.” Accordingly, concerns both
about offensive weapons systems like the MX missile and budgetary
concerns in an era of expanding deficits took precedence.
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There is of course room for reasonable criticism of Moynihan on this
score, as on others. Whether the Soviet Union was careening toward a
cliff of its own disintegrative accord or whether Reagan shoved it over
the edge remains a subject of debate. But Moynihan’s views were consistent, not expedient. Moreover, since his youth he had considered them
liberal. He told the New Republic in 1977, at his muscular Cold Warrior
peak: “I’m a member of the [Americans for Democratic Action] generation: people who got out of the services after the Second World War and
wanted to get into liberal politics. In New York, and I expect a lot of
other places, the central struggle of the time was with the Stalinist left.
ADA organized us, and upheld us.”
W h at Is a Moy nih a n Liber a l ?
What, then, shall we make of Moynihan’s pungent critiques of liberals,
critiques accompanied by his frequent praise of conservative thinkers
ranging from Burke to Oakeshott, Kristol to Strauss?
This, after all, is someone who said that after the Great Society he
“had considerably scaled down my expectations of what government
could do about most things — in the early 1960s in Washington we
thought we could do anything, and we found out different — and had
acquired the discipline of not being too much impressed by cleverseeming people.” Liberalism in that era, he complained, “lost a sense
of limits.” He lectured Democrats in 1968 — in a volume edited by a
Republican congressman, and, to add insult, entitled Republican
Papers — that “somehow liberals have been unable to acquire from life
what conservatives seem to be endowed with at birth, namely, a healthy
skepticism of the powers of government to do good.”
Citations to conservatives, meanwhile, pepper his writings. Moynihan
studied at the London School of Economics around the time Michael
Oakeshott arrived there, and he appears to have attended at least some of
the latter’s lectures. Significantly, he deployed Oakeshott against both parties, such as when he accused each of excessive scientism in the formation
of social policy: “A larger possibility is that we are seeing at work in both
‘liberal’ Democratic and ‘conservative’ Republican administrations the
demon that Michael Oakeshott has identified as Rationalism — the great
heresy of modern times.” (Again the quotation marks framing “liberal”
and “conservative” are suggestive.) He quoted Burke at least two dozen
times in his writings. He invoked Podhoretz against liberal doomsaying.
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Part of the explanation for all this is that he believed liberalism
needed to be nourished by an internal critique from which, especially
amid the moralism of the 1960s, it had insulated itself. About his 1976 run
for Senate, he said, “I ran as a liberal willing to be critical of what liberals
had done. If we did not do this, I contended, our liberalism would go
soft.” Moreover, some conservatives have mistaken Moynihan’s capacious
intellectual curiosity, which spanned not only a diversity of topics but
also a diversity of perspectives, for political compatibility. Instead, his
particular proclivity for associating with, reading, and quoting conservative thinkers arose from a suppleness and habit of mind that actively
sought disagreement — an aptitude largely, and sadly, lost not merely
among statesmen but among scholars, a similarly insular profession.
In assessing Moynihan’s relationship to neoconservatism, the issue of
party is inescapable as well. Whether because the movement has shifted,
because the major political parties have realigned, or both, neoconservatism is more monolithically Republican today than when Kristol wrote
in 1976. There is also no question that the second generation of neoconservatives is less Burkean and more Wilsonian than the first.
But the explanation, ultimately, distills to this: Moynihan was neither a neoconservative nor a paleoliberal. Moynihan was Moynihan.
He believed in government as an agent of good, but also in limitation
as a condition of life. As he wrote in 1973: “Increasingly, it is what is
known about life that makes it problematical. . . . The unexpected, the
unforeseen: the public life of our age seems dominated by events of
this cast.” He believed in a politics rooted in empirical circumstance
rather than theoretical abstraction. He championed the subsidiary units
of society — family, ethnic group, neighborhood. He respected society’s
complexity, but also believed some problems required political and national solutions.
I have called this “Burkean liberalism.” But if the issue of Moynihan
and the neoconservatives comes down to labels, perhaps a time may
come when individuals of a certain bent, with a certain combination of
beliefs, will describe themselves as “Moynihan liberals.” This would be
as good a time as any.
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